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The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal
Environmental Statutes: Strict Criminal
Liability in Substance But Not Form
No defendant to come before this Court has exhibited a more callous and
flagrant disregard for the safety and lives of vast numbers of citizens... than
this defendant .... The managers of industry [who have] no concern with
how... pollutants are disposed of earn the enmity of citizens and commit
ecologic suicide.
-Comments of Judge Allen of the Western District of Kentucky upon sen-
tencing of the president of a disposal company to two years in jail for delib-




T HE extent of the damage caused to the environment and to the
health of the world's population through industrial pollution is stag-
gering. To name just a few examples, acid rain is slowly destroying
northeastern freshwater fisheries and forests.2 The depletion of the ozone
layer threatens to alter radically the climatic patterns of the earth and to
expose humans to dangerous solar rays.3 Land-fill disposal of wastes
forced the evacuation of an entire residential development in the infa-
mous Love Canal disaster.4 One study has concluded that approximately
1. United States v. Distler, Crim. No. 77-00108, Transcript of Sentencing 10 (Sept. 14, 1979)
(cited in Note, Federal Enforcement of Individual and Corporate Criminal Liability for Water Pollu-
tion, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. Rnv. 576, 607 (1980) [hereinafter Federal Enforcement]).
2. See Reiger, What Can Be Done About Acid Rain?, FIELD AND STREAM 15 (Apr. 1987);
Peterson, Watch on Acid Rain. A Midterm Report, 132 Sci-NEws 36 (July 18, 1987); Begley, Who'll
Stop the Acid Rain, 107 NEWSWEEK 60 (Mar. 29, 1986); Tangley, Acid Rain: The Evidence Mounts,
36 BIOSCIENCE 366 (June 1986).
3. See Singer & Crandahl, Assessing the Threat to the Ozone, CONSUM. Rns. MAG. 11 (July
1987); The Heat is On, 130 TIME 58 (October 19, 1987); The Ozone Hole, 257 ScI. AMER. 19 (Aug.
1987); Brasseur, The Endangered Ozone Layer, 29 ENV. 6 (Jan.-Feb. 87).
4. The Love Canal disaster riveted the public's attention in the late 1970s. Hooker Chemical
Company improperly buried thousands of drums of industrial solvents under the land that had once
been a canal. Hooker eventually sold part of this land for residential development. The people who
moved into this area later reported unusually high incidences of stillborn children, deafness, birth
defects, retardation, and deterioration of bone marrow. In 1978, the New York State Health Com-
missioner recommended the evacuation of the area because of the "great and imminent" peril
presented by the contamination. The State eventually purchased the contaminated homes. BROWN,
LAYING WASTE 3-38 (1979); See N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1978, at A18, col. 1 (for report of evacuation
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nine percent of all deaths annually in the United States, about 140,000
per year, can be attributed to air pollution.5 Despite this alarming evi-
dence, pollution continues at an extraordinary rate.6
The general public first became aware of the dangers of pollution in
the late 1960s and early 1970s.7 The Federal Government began to ad-
dress the problem more aggressively at that time, but mainly in a civil
context.' Civil remedies were pursued in large measure because the act of
polluting had not yet engendered the kind of moral condemnation nor-
mally associated with criminality.9 Gradually, though, the realization
came that pollution, because of its scope and long term ill effects, was at
least as morally reprehensible as most crimes. A 1984 poll placed envi-
ronmental crimes seventh on the list of severity, ahead of such crimes as
armed robbery and bribing public officials.10 This shift in perception,
combined with the realization that the civil approach was meeting with
recommendation); McQuaig, The Legacy of Love Canal, McLEANs 10 (Oct. 3, 1987) (overview of
the aftermath of the disaster).
5. Mendelsohn & Orcutt, An Empirical Analysis of Air Pollution Dose Response Curves, 6 J.
ENVT'L EcoN. AND MGaMT. 85 (1979); see Kramer, Corporate Criminality in CORPORAAIONS AS
CRIMINALS 20 (E. Hochstedler, ed. 1984) (air pollution estimated to cause 140,000 deaths annually),
6. It has been estimated that between 255 and 275 million metric tons of hazardous waste is
produced in the United States each year. Mosher, EPA Still Doesn't Know the Dimensions of the
Nation's Hazardous Waste Problem, NAT'L. L. J., Apr. 16, 1983 at 796. The EPA has also estimated
that ninety percent of the hazardous waste produced annually in the United States is disposed of
improperly. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
7. Morris, Environmental Problems and the Use of Criminal Sanctions, 7 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 421, 422 (1972); Ways, The Environment, A National Mission for the Seventies, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION 1 (Jaffe & Tribe, eds. 1971) (description of the mounting public awareness of
environmental problems).
8. Civil remedies proved ineffective as a deterrent to corporate polluters. One of the preliminary
objectives of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was to eliminate
completely the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (1982).
The enforcement under these amendments has been mainly civil and, at present, we are still far from
realizing this goal.
Many of the statutes had criminal provisions, but they were rarely used. See infra notes 114-49
and accompanying text; see also Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for
Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALB. L. REv. 61 (1972) [hereinafter Criminal Responsibility].
9. The principal reasons for this were that, in most cases, individual acts of pollution did not
produce radically noticeable ill-effects and the offenders (often corporate officers) were upstanding
members of the community. See Comment, Putting Polluters in Jail The Imposition of Criminal
Sanctions on Corporate Defendants Under Environmental Statutes, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 93,
95-99 (1985) [hereinafter Putting Polluters in Jail] (discussion of reasons for the sparing use of crimi-
nal sanctions in environmental cases).
10. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, January 1984 (cited in
Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENvr'L AFF. L. REV. 379, 380 n.1 (1986)). A 1970
Harris Poll indicated that most Americans considered pollution to be the most serious problem
facing their community. Criminal Responsibility, supra note 8, at 68.
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little success, resulted in an increase in the use of the criminal provisions
of federal environmental statutes.
Many commentators have argued that the most effective way to deal
with illegal pollution is to actively pursue, on a wide scale, criminal con-
victions"1 against corporate policy-makers for environmental viola-
tions.12 This Comment subscribes to this point of view. One of the
principal objections leveled against this approach is that the chances of
consistently obtaining convictions against corporate officers13 are limited
because of the mens rea requirements of federal environmental statutes
and the more stringent standard of proof exacted in all criminal proceed-
ings.14 This Comment will demonstrate that criminal convictions of cor-
porate officers for environmental offenses could be obtained more easily
than the critics suggest. Two avenues are available. The first involves full
utilization of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, a rarely invoked strict
liability statute covering water pollution. 5 Secondly, the case law sug-
gests that, even where federal environmental statutes impose mens rea
requirements, the standard employed in substance, though not in form, is
one of strict liability.
The analysis will begin with an examination of the historical devel-
opment of the federal government's response to the problem of pollution,
11. For the purposes of this Comment, "criminal convictions" refers to jail sentences, not crimi-
nal fines.
12. See Starr, supra note 10, at 379 ("Congress recognized the public's concern by providing
criminal sanctions for violations of environmental laws.. ."); Putting Polluters in Jail, supra note 9,
at 97 ("The social stigma which attaches to a criminal proceeding and to imprisonment will be an
effective deterrent... .); See generally Comment, Prosecuting Corporate Polluters: The Sparing Use of
Criminal Sanctions, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 659 (1985) [hereinafter Sparing Use of Sanctions] (general
support for the use of criminal sanctions); Comment, Criminal Enforcement of Federal Water Pollu-
tion Laws in an Era of Deregulation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 642 (1982) [hereinafter Era of
Deregulation] (support for the use of criminal sanctions).
13. Corporate officers frequently insulate themselves from actual knowledge through corporate
compartmentalization.
14. The mens rea requirements of the criminal provisions of environmental statutes are difficult
to meet because of the division of tasks and compartmentalization of most large corporations. There
is also the probability that an officer will disclaim knowledge of a violation and blame it on a
subordinate. Further, in criminal proceedings, guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
whereas in civil cases the standard is a preponderance of the evidence. Sparing Use of Sanctions,
supra note 12, at 661.
It has also been found that punishment of individual officers for corporate crimes of any type has
been extremely uncommon in the United States. One study concluded that only 1.5 percent of all
criminal enforcement efforts in 1975 and 1976 resulted in the conviction of a corporate officer (of
these, only twenty percent were high level officers). M. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
206 (1976).
15. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899) (Current
version at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)) [hereinafter Refuse Act].
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with particular emphasis on the evolution of criminal environmental
sanctions. Practical and theoretical justifications for the use of criminal
sanctions against corporate officers for environmental violations will also
be explored. This Comment will then show how the strict criminal liabil-
ity provisions of the Refuse Act can be combined with relevant holdings
of the United States Supreme Court to convict corporate officers for pol-
lution of navigable waterways. Next, the criminal provisions of the major
federal environmental statutes will be outlined. Finally, an analysis of the
relevant case law will demonstrate that, even when a criminal environ-
mental statute has a mens rea requirement, the operational standard for-
mulated by the courts is one of strict liability.
II. HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (more commonly known as the
Refuse Act) was the first federal legislation dealing with pollution.16 It
provided for a misdemeanor penalty of up to one year in prison and/or a
fine of up to $2,50011 for discharge of any "refuse matter" into the navi-
gable waters of the United States. 8 The Act imposed a standard of strict
liability upon polluters. However, the utility of the statute for purposes of
water pollution control was severely limited by judicial interpretations
that applied it only to discharges that obstructed navigation. 19 This limi-
16. The Refuse Act states:
[I]t shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to
be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other float-
ing craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment or mill of
any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever.., into any navigable
water of the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the
same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful to
deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind in any place on
the bank of any navigable water ... whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or
obstructed...
Id. at § 13 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)).
The Refuse Act was not the first statute to employ criminal sanctions for environmental regula-
tion. In the fourteenth century, an Englishman was executed for violating a royal proclamation on
smoke abatement. See Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 25 S. CAL. L. Rav. 349, 352 (1954).
See generally Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at 578-85 (outline of Refuse Act provisions);
Glenn, The Crime of "Pollution". The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 835, 840-59 (1973) (detailed commentary on Refuse Act).
17. Refuse Act, supra note 15, § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
18. The Refuse Act modified §§ 6, 7, and 8 of its predecessor, Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 299, 28
Stat. 363, which enjoined the deposition of refuse matter into navigable waters "for the improvement
of which money has been appropriated." Morris, supra note 7, at n.18. The Refuse Act extended
coverage to all navigable waters as well as the tributaries thereof. See supra note 16.
19. See, eg., Warner-Quinlan Co. v. United States, 273 F. 503 (3d Cir. 1921); United States v.
Ballard Oil Co. of Hartford, 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952); Maier v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol
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tation was a reflection of society's failure to perceive pollution as a signif-
icant problem, and was due in large measure to a lack of technical
knowledge regarding the potential dangers of pollution. Further obscur-
ing the danger was the absence of any outwardly perceptible sign of envi-
ronmental degradation. Additionally, between 1917 and 1945, national
attention was understandably focused on two world wars and the Great
Depression, rather than on as yet invisible environmental problems.
The first glimmer of realization that pollution was more than a mere
nuisance came after the Second World War. However, the prevailing at-
titude endorsed negotiation between industry and government as the best
means of dealing with the problem, with the threat of civil sanctions pro-
viding the motivation for compliance.20 The Water Pollution Control
Act of 1948 (WPCA)2 1 reflected this approach.
The WPCA required the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service to initiate government action through the issuance of notice to
the alleged polluter22 and to his state.23 The Surgeon General could
then serve the polluter with suggestions for abatement and a compliance
schedule.24 If the compliance dates were ignored, a second notice could
be given.25 If the second notice were disregarded, a board would be con-
vened and a public hearing held on the matter. After the hearing, the
board would make its recommendations for abatement.26 Only after all
of these suggestions had been ignored could the case be referred to the
United States Attorney's Office for a possible lawsuit.2 The predictable
result of this cumbersome mechanism was that, from the date of the
Co., 62 F.Supp 161 (E.D. Pa. 1945), aff'dper curiam, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946); United States v.
Bigan, 170 F.Supp. 219 (W.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1960).
20. In 1973 Michael K. Glenn, former Deputy Assistant Administrator for Federal Water En-
forcement stated: "[D]uring the past twenty-five years the federal government has relied almost
exclusively on negotiation, public pressure, and voluntary compliance... as the principal means of
achieving compliance with federal water pollution control laws." Putting Polluters in Jail, supra note
9, at 102.
21. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as amended in 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-
1376 (1982)) [hereinafter WPCA].
22. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, § 2(d)(2), 62 Stat. 1155, 1156.
To qualify as a "polluter" under the WPCA it was necessary to demonstrate that the discharge
endangered "the health or welfare of persons in a state other than that in which the discharge oper-
ate[d] .. ." 33 U.S.C. § 466(d)(1) (1952). This was a harsh requirement because of the difficulty in
showing that a particular defendant's discharge (apart from of all of the other sources of pollution)
caused harm to people in another state.
23. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, § 2(d)(2), 62 Stat. 1155, 1156.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 2(d)(3).
27. Id. § 2(d)(4). It is important to note that, throughout this long and arduous process, the
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Act's passage in 1948, until 1965, not a single lawsuit was initiated. 28
Unofficial negotiations between the regulatory agencies and industrial
polluters were the only practical alternative to the administrative quag-
mire created by the WIPCA.29
In 1956, amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 30
were passed in an attempt to stimulate enforcement. Ironically, the
amendment added yet another conference requirement to the already
complex procedures of the initial Act,31 which only added to the confu-
sion and delay.32
The Water Quality Act of 196533 established procedures by which
states would determine maximum pollution levels for waterways. These
standards were intended to create a more easily demonstrable cause of
action under FWPCA. However, this approach was fraught with practi-
cal difficulties, for it was nearly impossible to prove that an individual
polluter was responsible for the decline in quality of an entire body of
water.
34
Increasing public awareness of the dangers of pollution led to a
somewhat more aggressive enforcement effort in the late 1960s and early
discharges were permitted to continue unabated. There was no provision for the issuance of a tempo-
rary restraining order.
28. Hearings on S.4 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Pub. Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-32 (1965). Note also that WPCA contains no criminal
sanctions.
29. Glenn, supra note 16, at 836 n.7; see Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation,
68 MICH. L. Rsv. 1103 (1970).
30. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498 [hereinafter 1956
Amendments].
31. The conference was to be between the Surgeon General and the appropriate state pollution
control agency. 33 U.S.C. § 466(g)(c)(1) (1958).
32. Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at 581 (outlines how the 1956 amendments caused even
further delay in the abatement procedure).
In 1961, additional amendments were passed to FWPCA. These served mainly to broaden the
Act's jurisdiction and did nothing to streamline the abatement procedure. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204.
33. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-466n (Supp. V (1965-
69)).
34. See Grady, Effluent Charges and the Industrial Water Pollution Problem, 5 NEW ENOL. L.
Rnv. 61, 75 (1969) (for an illustration of the difficulties of proving erosion in water quality).
Criticisms of the Water Quality Act were similar to those levied against other legislative efforts to
control pollution until that time. These criticisms concerned the lack of sufficient funding to provide
adequate manpower for enforcement purposes, the states' tolerance of excessive recalcitrance on the
part of the dischargers, the predisposition of administrators to rely upon persuasion rather than
punishment, and the lack of procedures adequate to differentiate between noncompliance due to
hardship and noncompliance due to bad faith excuses. Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at 583.
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1970s. The Refuse Act was given new clout in light of Supreme Court
rulings which expanded the judicial definition of the term "refuse" as
used in the Act to include "all foreign substances. '35 This change al-
lowed the government to criminally prosecute polluters under the Act's
36strict liability provisions.
In spite of this change, however, polluters still were not considered
criminal in a moral sense. Consequently, there was a reluctance to prose-
cute individuals criminally. Many of the cases brought under the Refuse
Act were civil in nature,37 and those that were criminal were brought
against the corporate entity rather than an individual corporate officer.
Criminal prosecutions were pursued only in cases of "isolated and instan-
taneous discharges resulting in serious damage" and not in cases of
"continuing" discharge.38 Since the major thrust of the effort was pro-
curement of civil and criminal fines against corporations, the utility of
the Act was severely curtailed by the maximum fine limitation of only
$2,500.
39
Regulators attempting to control pollution under the Refuse Act
were faced with a dilemma. The Act called for an absolute prohibition of
discharges, making it unlawful to "discharge... refuse matter of any
kind... into any navigable waters of the United States.. ."I However,
in most cases, it was not desirable to completely enjoin discharges, be-
cause such extreme action would result in the closing of industrial plants.
35. United States v. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. 224 (1966); see Tripp & Hall, Federal Enforcement
Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALB. L. REv. 60 (1970) (for a description of the revitalization of
the Refuse Act).
36. See supra note 16 (for the language of the strict liability provisions of the Refuse Act).
Most of the early prosecutions under the revitalized Refuse Act were against corporations rather
than individual corporate officers. See United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (lst Cir.
1974); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 491 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1972).
37. Civil actions under the Refuse Act primarily sought injunctive relief. See, eg., United States
v. Florida Power and Light Co., 311 F.Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (court declined to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction to enjoin the defendant from discharging heated water into Biscayne Bay absent a
showing of irreparable harm). Between December 3, 1970 and December 31, 1972, the EPA referred
106 civil Refuse Act actions to the Justice Department. Glenn, supra note 16, at n.56.
38. Glenn, supra note 16, at 848. In the early 1970s, regulatory violations were viewed mainly as
economic crimes lacking the kind of moral culpability necessary to warrant incarceration. F. GRAD,
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 2-561 to 2-562 (1983). See Putting Polluters in Jail, supra
note 9, at 96 (for the observation that environmental regulation is not the only area in which courts
have been unwilling to impose substantial punishments).
39. See supra note 17. A fine of $2500 is negligible for a multi-million dollar chemical manufac-
turer. Fines this small are easily assimilated as a cost of doing business. Sparing Use of Sanctions,
supra note 12, at 664.
40. See supra note 16.
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Such actions would be devastating from an economic perspective--di-
minishing the nation's productive capacity and eliminating jobs. As a
practical matter then, the overriding goal was abatement of discharges,
rather than their complete elimination.41
In an effort to circumvent this problem, in 1970, President Nixon
issued an Executive Order instituting the "Refuse Act Permit Pro-
gram."' 42 The Permit Program authorized the Secretary of the Army to
permit the discharge of pollutants within limits set by the Chief of Engi-
neers.43 Each discharger was required to apply for a permit from the
Secretary, even if it was operating well within the mandated parame-
ters.44 The Program was attractive because the permits imposed specific
effluent limitations, the violation of which constituted a breach of the
Refuse Act itself.4" There was no need, as there had been under the
Water Quality Act of 1965,46 to show that the specific discharge de-
graded the quality of the entire body of water.
Despite its promising start, the Permit Program ultimately proved
unsuccessful. The basis of the Program, the Refuse Act, provided insuffi-
cient monetary fines to serve as an effective deterrent.47 Additionally, the
administration of the Program was virtually crippled through the judicial
requirement that an Environmental Impact Statement be prepared for
every permit application submitted.48
The Refuse Act Permit Program was replaced by the 1972 amend-
41. Glenn, supra note 16, at 847.
42. Exec. Order No. 11,574, 3 C.F.R. 309-10 (1973).
43. The Refuse Act itself was amended as follows:
And provided further, That the Secretary of the Army, whenever in the judgement of the
Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby, may permit the
deposit of any material above mentioned in navigable waters, within limits to be defined
and under conditions to be prescribed by him, provided application is made to him prior
to depositing such material; and whenever any permit is so granted the conditions
thereof shall be strictly complied with, and any violation thereof shall be unlawful.
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
Under President Nixon's Executive Order, the Secretary of the Army was required to consult
with the Administrator of the EPA before issuing regulations, procedures and instructions for per-
mit applications. See supra note 42.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
45. Id.
46. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
47.' See supra note 17.
48. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). The Army Corps of Engineers received more
than 20,000 permit applications at the time of the Kalur decision. Glenn, supra note 16, at 854.
Environmental Impact Statements are detailed statements of the likely environmental impact of a
[Vol. 37
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ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.49 The 1972 Amend-
ments implemented a National Permit System50 and provided for more
substantial civil"1 and criminal sanctions. 2 The Amendments also ex-
plictly provided that Environmental Impact Statements need not be pre-
pared for every permit application. "
The passage of the 1972 amendments demonstrated Congressional
resolve to effectively address the problem of pollution. The passage in
1977 of the Clean Water Act,54 which was essentially an amendment to
the 1972 amendments, further evidenced this commitment. The Clean
Water Act stiffens the criminal sanctions of the 1972 Amendments by
proposed action by a federal agency. They are required under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982).
Despite its demise, the Refuse Act Permit Program accomplished the following:
(a) The criminal actions brought thereunder focused public attention on the criminality of water
pollution.
(b) The threat of individual criminal liability made corporate officers more cognizant of environ-
mental laws.
(c) The federal government established a willingness to go to court over environmental viola-
tions.
(d) The permit system encouraged voluntary compliance.
(e) The inadequacy of the fines collected under the system provided Congress with valuable data
in drafting new legislation.
Glenn, supra note 16, at 857-58.
49. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47
[hereinafter 1972 Amendments]. Note, however, that the Refuse Act has never been repealed.
50. The framework of the Permit System is found in Title III (Standards and Enforcement) and
Title IV (Permits and Licenses). Title IV authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to issue permits
for discharge based on the standards established in Title III. 1972 Amendments, supra note 49,
§ 402(a). Title III requires the EPA to promulgate standards for effluent quality based upon, "the
best available technology economically achievable... which will result in reasonable further pro-
gress toward ... eliminating the discharge of all pollutants." Id. §§ 301(b)(1)(A), (2)(A).
51. Civil remedies may be pursued for any violation of Title III or IV. See supra note 50. The
maximum civil penalty is $10,000 per day of violation. 1972 Amendments, supra note 49, § 309(d).
Temporary and permanent injunctions may also be sought. Id. § 309(b).
52. The major criminal provision of the 1972 Amendments is § 309(c):
(1) Any person who willfully or negligently violates [any substantive provision of
Title III or IV]... shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than
$25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.
(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, representation, or certifi-
cation in any application, record, report, plan or other document filed or required to be
maintained... or who falsifies, tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any
monitoring device... shall upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term "person" shall [include] ... any respon-
sible corporate officer.
1972 Amendments, supra note 49, § 309(c).
53. Id. § 51 1(c)(1); see supra note 48 and accompanying text; Glenn, supra note 16, at 854.
54. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
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increasing the fines and providing for maximum one year jail sentences."5
The criminal and civil provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, as modified by the 1972 amendments and the Clean Water
Act, typify the Congressional approach to the problem of pollution. The
Clean Air Act 16 was passed in 1970 and served as a model for the 1972
amendments to FVWPCA.5 7 In 1976, the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA) 8 was passed to provide cradle-to-grave documenta-
tion of the movement of hazardous wastes. In 1980, Congress passed
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA) 9 which created a "Superfund" to pay for federal
cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Both RCRA and CERCLA provide for
substantial civil6' and criminal 61 penalties for their violation.
Despite the fact that, by 1972, the major federal environmental stat-
utes contained criminal provisions, pursuit of civil remedies remained the
norm for the next decade. 62 However, by the late 1970's, under pressure
from the Carter Administration and an impatient Congress,63 the Envi-
55. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (for a more detailed analysis of the criminal
provisions of the Clean Water Act).
56. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
57. Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at 588.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
59. Id. §§ 9601-9657.
60. Civil remedies under RCRA can attach for violation of any of its provisions and record
keeping requirements. Remedies available include temporary restraining orders, 42 U.S.C. § 6973
(1982), and civil fines of up to $25,000 per day, id. § 6928(a)(3).
Under CERCLA, if the President determines that there is an "imminent and substantial" threat
to public health or the environment from an actual or threatened toxic discharge, he may authorize
the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982). Failure to comply with an
order issued under CERCLA can result in fines of up to $5,000 per day and treble damages. Id.
§ 9606(b).
61. See infra notes 125-33, 134-37 and accompanying text (for discussion of the criminal provi-
sions of RCRA and CERCLA, respectively).
62. Only fifteen criminal cases were brought under the federal environmental statutes between
December 1972 and November 1974. White Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
169, 370 n.1721 (1980). By way of contrast, between 1977 and 1985, 1,210 civil actions and 676
judicial consent decrees were filed. McMurry & Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 1133, 1136 n.10 (1986).
63. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1135, 1141. The impatience of Congress is evidenced
by the following:
The Committee, of course, has in the record documentation of the poor enforcement
under the 1965 Act. The Committee concluded that not only were there weaknesses in
the procedures established on enforcement, there were weaknesses in the overall design
of enforceable requirements.
The Committee further recognizes that sanctions under existing law have not been
sufficient...
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ronmental Protection Agency" began to allocate more resources to en-
forcement, and in particular, to criminal enforcement.
This new strategy began to be implemented in the early 1980s. In
1981, the Office of Criminal Enforcement was created within the EPA.6"
This body's mission is to implement the EPA's commitment to the use of
criminal sanctions.66 Prior to 1982, there were no full-time EPA criminal
investigators. Between 1982 and 1986, however, the number had reached
thirty-five.6 7 Further, an Environmental Crimes Unit was organized in
the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice68
to prosecute criminal cases and seek substantial penalties, including
incarceration. 69
The results of this effort have been encouraging thus far. Between
fiscal 1983 and fiscal 1986, 252 indictments have been returned.7' Two
hundred two of those indictments have been against corporate officers in
their personal capacity. 71 Two hundred eleven guilty pleas have been
obtained and over ten accumulated years of actually-served jail time has
been meted out.
72
Despite the increase, the use of criminal environmental sanctions
has not caught up proportionally with the enforcement of more tradi-
SENATE COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1971, S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 63-64 (1971).
64. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established by President Nixon on De-
cember 2, 1970. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072-75 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app.
75-85 (West Supp. 1985), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-80, 97 Stat. 485
(1983). The EPA is charged with administering the Federal environmental statutes.
See generally Starr, supra note 10 (for an overview of EPA's enforcement efforts with respect to
the criminal environmental statutes).
65. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1140.
66. Id.
67. Starr, supra note 10, at 380 n.2.
68. Id. at 381; McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1140.
69. Id.
70. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1141 n.32. In 1984 alone, the EPA initiated seventy-
nine new criminal investigations and referred thirty-one cases to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution. Tundermann, Personal Liability for Corporate Directors, Officers, Employees and Con-
trolling Shareholders under State and Federal Environmental Laws, 31 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
2-1, 2-4 (1985).
See, eg., United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F.Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d
1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980), defendants petition to vacate dismissed, 491
F.Supp. 1339 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 642 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1981), dismissed again on remand, 546
F.Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1983) (defendant officers of mushroom
farming operation sentenced to 30 days for allowing toxic manure to flow into a creek).
71. McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at n.32.
72. ML
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tional crimes.73 Not surprisingly, the number of criminal environmental
prosecutions undertaken does not even represent a substantial fraction of
the total number of environmental crimes actually committed. 74 Crimi-
nal and civil enforcement must compete for the limited resources avail-
able to the EPA.75 These budgetary problems were exacerbated by
spending cuts instituted during the Reagan administration.76
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
AGAINST CORPORATE OFFICERS
Deterrence is the fundamental justification for the use of criminal
sanctions against corporate officers for environmental violations. 77 There
can be little doubt that managers would be highly motivated to seek out
and remedy potential transgressions if they knew that there existed a sub-
stantial possibility of personal incarceration if their corporation violated
an environmental statute.
An oft-voiced objection to this rationale is that studies have been
unable to establish a clear link between certainty of criminal conviction
and deterrence.78 Many of these studies were weighted heavily with
73. Sparing Use of Sanctions, supra note 12, at 665; see NAT'L INST. OF LAw ENFORCEMENT &
CRIM. JUSTICE, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR xxii (M.
Clinard, project director, 1979).
74. Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15 ELR 10065, 10066
(1985).
75. Id (for assessment that the disparity between the number of criminal prosecutions launched
and the actual number of environmental crimes committed is due mainly to lack of sufficient fund-
ing); see Starr, supra note 10 (for overview of EPA's program of criminal prosecution within existing
budgetary constraints).
76. In his first six months in office, President Reagan moved to substantially cut EPA funding.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1801, 95 Stat. 764 (1981). Re-
sponding to the cuts, former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle said, "This is not a question of
saving money... this is a wrecking crew at work." N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1981, at A20, col. 1. See
generally Era of Deregulation, supra note 12 (for a detailed critique of the Reagan cuts of EPA
operating budgets).
77. See Sparing Use of Sanctions, supra note 12, at 675 ("Criminal sanctions levied against cor-
porate polluters can be an effective method of deterring illegal conduct.... ."); Putting Polluters in
Jail, supra note 9, at 101 (arguing that the broad purpose of the criminal provisions of the environ-
mental statutes is deterrence). In 1978, James R. Moorman, then Assistant Attorney General of the
Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice said, "[iut is self-evident that
corporations work through individuals and that the nature of criminal responsibility is such that it
properly falls on individuals." Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at 598 (quoting J. MOORMAN,
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS, reprinted in ALI-ABA, ENVIRON-
MENTAL ENFORCEMENT 27 (1978)).
A corollary to the notion of deterrence is that, because of the greater deterrent effect, the use of
criminal sanctions will be a more prospective remedy than civil sanctions have proved to be.
78. See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 198-
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crimes and criminals less likely to be affected by the threat of incarcera-
tion than would corporate officers in the context of environmental
crimes.79 An upper-middle class corporate officer would probably be stig-
matized to a greater degree by his peers upon a criminal conviction than
would a member of a lower socioeconomic class.
Another objection to the use of criminal sanctions against corporate
officers is that, in many instances, the officer does not, in fact, have
knowledge of the commission of the illegal act. To hold such a person
criminally liable, it is argued, would be patently unjust.80 It is this type of
capricious government action that the substantive and procedural protec-
tions of the criminal law were designed to guard against." This argument
ignores the reality of the corporate form. If actual knowledge of the vio-
lation were required in every case, rarely would an officer of a large cor-
poration be convicted. But, since such officers formulate company
policies and procedures, they should be held ultimately responsible for
the acts of their employees.8 2
A strong argument can be made that crimes against the environ-
ment are more reprehensible than most "traditional" crimes. The dam-
age wrought by pollution is devastating, widespread, and will be present
for generations.83 Countless individuals have suffered ill-health and many
have died as a result of pollution. These crimes are coolly carried out in a
premeditated and methodical manner, motivated by the desire to make a
202 (4th ed. 1983) (overview of studies on criminal sanctions and deterrence); A. REISS & A.
BIDERMAN, DATA SOURCES ON WHITE-COLLAR LAW-BREAKING x I vi (1980) ("Surprisingly little
is known from statistics or formal experiment about how white-collar offending may be deterred by
the imposition of sanctions.. . ."). But see supra note 77.
79. In most traditional instances of criminal activity, the actor is less likely to be deterred by the
threat of incarceration because he is motivated by a burst of passion or because he is apathetic as to
the possibility of going to prison, or to the possibility of having the stigma of a criminal conviction
placed on his record. For an upper class executive, none of these qualifications apply. Such a person
would likely be acutely sensitive to the prospect of criminal prosecution. See H. PACKER, THE LIM-
ITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 356 (1968). See supra note 77.
80. See Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Crim-
inal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1571, 1572 (1978) (conviction without knowledge sub-
verts the basic meaning of innocence).
81. The Supreme Court has already held that this type of vicarious criminal liability is permissi-
ble when the prosecutions occur under public welfare statutes. The rationale is that the need to
protect the public welfare is paramount and that corporate officers must be motivated to seek out
and prevent harm to the public. See infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (for a complete
analysis of the Court's rulings).
82. Officers can still be responsible for the actions of their employees even if they do not specifi-
cally order them to violate the law. Often tacit approval is given through failure to disapprove a
particular practice.
83. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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profit.8 4 In United States v. Manfred De Rewal,5 the defendant was the
owner and manager of a company that held itself out as an expert in the
area of hazardous waste disposal and storage. The company was paid
more than $200,000 to properly store certain chemicals. Instead of so
doing, the chemicals were dumped into the Delaware River near the
Phildelphia water treatment plant.8 6 Acts of such callousness and scope
must be branded morally unacceptable by our society through the stigma
of criminal classification. 7
Another justification for the use of criminal sanctions against corpo-
rate officers is that the alternative to criminal sanctions--civil actions
resulting principally in fines-is ineffective as a tool of deterrence.88
Fines are typically calculated as an ordinary cost of doing business, and
are ultimately passed on to the public in the form of higher prices.89
Therefore, society in general, the victims of environmental crime, may
84. It might be argued that, at least a few decades ago, pollution was more the result of igno-
rance than of a desire to make profit. However, even early in this century, certain polluters were
hardly ignorant of the potential danger of their acts. The most striking example is the asbestos
industry's knowledge of that chemical's harmful effects well before lawsuits publicized the problem.
See P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUcT (1985). Further, publicity regarding the problem of
pollution, the proliferation of government regulation, and the improvement of scientific monitoring
makes the ignorance excuse untenable today.
85. Crim. No. 77-287 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (cited in Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at 606
n. 180).
86. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six months in prison. Id. In United States v.
Distler, Crim. No. 77-00108-01-L (W.D. Ky. 1979) (cited in Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at
n.184), The defendant-president of a disposal company was convicted of the willful discharge of a
hazardous material that directly resulted in the injury of 161 people. Judson Starr, the Director of
the Environmental Crimes Unit of the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Justice Depart-
ment has observed that the typical environmental offenders' acts "... are generally willful, deliber-
ate, rational and pre-meditated; ... motivated by a desire to enjoy the substantial profits that can be
derived from such illegal activities." Starr, supra note 10, at 382.
87. The magnitude of the environmental harms that result from pollution seem to warrant a
greater societal condemnation in the form of longer jail sentences than the misdemeanors (maximum
sentence: one year) now found in the federal environmental statutes. See infra notes 114-49 and
accompanying text.
88. See Sparing Use of Sanctions, supra note 12, at 664 ("Nominal civil fines.., were viewed by
many corporations as a cost of doing business. . ."); Comment, The CriminalResponsibility of Corpo-
rate Officials for Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALB. L. REv. 61, 64-75 (1972).
89. The "Chicago School" of law and economics would advocate an increase of civil fines to the
point at which it becomes more economical for the corporation to abate rather than absorb the fines.
This approach would purportedly deter environmental crime at the lowest cost to society, "since
society expends capital to imprison an individual, while it increases its revenue through the collec-
tion of corporate fines." Era of Deregulation, supra note 12, at 666 (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 236 (2d ed. 1977)).
However, the "Chicago School" ignores such problems as: the possibility of corporations going
bankrupt as a result of large fines with the concomitant loss of jobs and damage to the economy; the
fact that the larger fines will also be passed along to the consumer (who is also the victim of the
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actually pay the offender's fine.9"
IV. APPLICATION OF THE REFUSE ACT TO THE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
Once it is accepted that a policy of aggressive criminal prosecution
of corporate officers for environmental violations should be pursued, and
effective means of implementation must be devised. The critical stum-
bling block is the difficulty of establishing that a corporate manager
possessed the statutorily-required mens rea.91 An analysis of federal stat-
utory and common law indicates that this obstacle already has been
largely overcome because the overriding standard in substance, though
not in form,92 is one of strict liability.
The Refuse Act of 189993 provides for strict criminal liability for
discharge of any "refuse matter" into the navigable waters of the United
States. As noted previously, the Refuse Act has never been repealed.9"
The Supreme Court's expansion of the definition of "refuse matter" to
include "all foreign substances," allowed for the prosecution of polluters
under the Act.95 However, most of the criminal actions brought under
the Refuse Act thus far have been against corporations rather than indi-
vidual corporate officers. Despite the manner in which the Refuse Act
has historically been used, it has the potential to become a powerful vehi-
cle for obtaining criminal convictions against corporate officers for water
pollution.
It is clear that, under the Refuse Act, criminal liability could attach
to the individual who, regardless of his state of mind, performs the actual
crime of pollution); and the unlikelihood that legislatures and courts would ever raise the fines to a
sufficient level. Era of Deregulation, supra note 12, at 666-67.
90. Because most of the products produced by the industrial processes that generate much pol-
lution are beneficial to society, society should bear some of the costs of the pollution. The point is
that the costs should be borne by society prospectively, in order to prevent pollution. When the costs
must be borne by society retrospectively, society pays not only through the costs of cleanup (if
cleanup is even possible), but also through the physical suffering brought about by the pollution.
Criminal sanctions against corporate officers will help to insure that society bears the costs in a
prospective fashion.
91. Until only recently, this burden discouraged prosecutors from even seeking criminal convic-
tions against individual corporate officers in environmental cases.
92. This refers to the federal environmental statutes containing mens rea requirements. See infra
notes 114-49 and accompanying text.
93. Refuse Act, supra note 16.
94. See supra note 49.
95. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cal act, and who in all probability had no knowledge of the incident in its
specificity,97 can be held liable under this statute.
The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in United States v. Dot-
terweich, 98 which dealt with the criminal prosecution of the president and
general manager of a drug company for violations of the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.99 The particular provision under which the de-
fendant was charged was one of strict liability. I" First, the Court ruled
that the defendant was a "person" within the contemplation of the stat-
ute. 101 Second, the Court ruled that the defendant could be held liable
even though he neither participated in the act, nor had any knowledge of
it. 102 The justification for this seemingly harsh ruling was based on the
public welfare character of the statute:
The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a now
familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of
regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for
criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the
larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.
10 3
In United States v. Park,"° the Supreme Court followed the reason-
ing of Dotterweich in upholding the conviction of the president of a large
grocery chain for violations of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
97. It is likely, however, that most corporate officers have at least some idea, or are at least
suspicious of, the types of activities engaged in by their employees.
98. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
99. 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).
100. The relevant provisions:
were based on § 301 of [the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act] .... which prohibits
"The introduction... into interstate commerce of any... drug... that is adulterated or
misbranded." "Any person" violating this provision is . . . made guilty of a
misdemeanor.
320 U.S. 277, 278 (1943).
101. The Court held that:
The statute makes "any person" who violates § 301(a) guilty of a "misdemeanor." It
specifically defines "person" to include "corporation." § 201(e). But the only way in
which a corporation can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf .... To hold
that the Act... freed all individuals... from... culpability ... is to defeat the very
object of the... Act.
d at 281.
Since the statutory language of the Refuse Act is similar to that of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, see supra notes 16, 100, corporate officers should be considered persons under the
Refuse Act as well.
102. It is also important to note that Dotterweich was convicted and the corporation was ac-
quitted. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278 (1943).
103. Id at 280-81.
104. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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In United States v. Park,104 the Supreme Court followed the reason-
ing of Dotterweich in upholding the conviction of the president of a large
grocery chain for violations of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. 105 In this case, the defendant was made aware of the violations and
had delegated the responsibility for remediation to a subordinate. The
remediation was not made. According to the opinion: "the Act imposes
not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they
occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will
insure that violations do not occur."
10 6
It is clear from the decisions in Dotterweich and Park that the high-
est corporate executives can be held criminally liable for the actions of
their subordinates."10 The issue of how far down the corporate ladder the
Court is willing to descend to attach this vicarious liability has not been
reached. 108
The goal of securing criminal convictions against corporate officers
for water pollution without having to meet any mens rea requirement can
be accomplished through a coupling of the Refuse Act with the reasoning
of Dotterweich and Park. The Refuse Act is a public welfare statute 09
that imposes strict criminal liability upon violators.110 Therefore, the
statutory underpinnings of a criminal prosecution pursuant to the Refuse
Act and those suits brought in Dotterweich and Park are identical.
A prosecution of this type would allow the government to subject
corporate policymakers to the threat of incarceration upon a showing:11
104. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
105. See supra note 100.
106. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975). See McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at
1152-54 (for an analysis of Park and Dotterweich); Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers
for Strict Liability Offenses - A Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 463
(1981).
Similar results were reached in Carolene Prods. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1944),
aff'd, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1001 (1967),
107. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
In Carolene Products, the Fourth Circuit held that "[tihere is ample authority in support of the
principle that the directing heads of a corporation which is engaged in an unlawful business may be
held criminally liable for the acts of subordinates.. ." 140 F.2d at 660.
108. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 ("It would be too treacherous to define... the class of em-
ployees which stands in such responsible relation.")
109. Indeed, it may be argued that the Refuse Act protects a much greater interest than the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because of the probable long-term effects of water pollution.
110. See supra note 16.
111. In many environmental cases, it is also difficult to establish causation because of the uncer-
tainty inherent in the monitoring devices. This problem exists in both the civil and criminal settings
and is beyond the scope of this analysis. It is encouraging to note, however, that scientific advances
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(1) of a discharge of "refuse matter" into the navigable waters of the
United States" 2 and (2) that the defendant held a position of sufficient
responsibility to be held accountable to the public. 113 This reduced bur-
den would make consistent criminal convictions a reality, thus maximiz-
ing the deterrant potential of the Refuse Act.
V. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES THAT IMPOSE MENS REA
REQUIREMENTS
Most of the Federal environmental statutes currently in effect have
scienter requirements in their criminal provisions. Before analyzing the
standards of proof necessary to meet these requirements, a brief overview
of the statutes will be provided.
A. Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act114 was passed in 1977. The purpose of the Act
according to its legislative history was to "put teeth" into the enforce-
ment mechanism of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act.115
The criminal provisions of the Act call for misdemeanor penalties of
up to one year in prison and/or a $25,000 per day fine for willful or
negligent violations of effluent limitations or permit requirements.'
1 6
Also, it mandates a misdemeanor penalty of up to six months in jail and/
or a $10,000 fine for knowing falsification of documents or tampering
with measuring devices.
11 7
in the area of measuring and monitoring equipment have helped to alleviate this problem somewhat.
See Sparing Use of Sanctions, supra note 12, at 662.
112. See supra note 16.
113. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81. This requirement should not be difficult to meet since the
highest corporate policy makers would be the targets.
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982); see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
115. The Committee on Public Works recommended stronger penalties with the "threat of sanc-
tion [being] real, and enforcement provisions [being] swift and direct." II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1483 (Gov't. Printing Office
1973). See supra note 53-54 and accompanying text.
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982):
Any person who willfully or negligently violates section 1311, 1312, 1317 or 1318 of this
title, or any permit condition or limitation... shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more
than one year, or by both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first
conviction - punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of viola-
tion or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both.
Id.
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982).
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Criminal convictions against corporate officers have been obtained
under the Clean Water Act. In United States v. Distler,118 the president
of a waste disposal company was convicted of willful violations of the
permit and discharge requirements of the Act. 119 The company was
found to have discharged toxic chemicals into the Louisville sewage sys-
tem. Exposure to the chemicals caused 161 people to require medical
care.120 The defendant president was sentenced to two years in prison
and fined $50,000.121
In United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc.,122 mushroom farmers were
convicted in their capacity as corporate officers for wilfully allowing
toxic manure to overflow into a local creek in contravention of the Clean
Water Act. 123 The defendants were each sentenced to thirty days in
prison and fined an aggregate of $50,000.24
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 121 regulates
the "treatment, storage, disposal [and] transportation" of hazardous
wastes. 126
RCRA provides for felony penalties of up to two years in prison
and/or a $50,000 per day of violation fine for knowingly: transporting
118. Crim. No. 77-00108-01-L (W.D. Ky. 1979) (cited in Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at
n.184). See supra note 86 (for discussion of Distler).
119. See supra note 116.
120. United States v. Distler, Crim. No. 77-00108, Transcript of Sentencing 9 (W.D. Ky. Sept.
14, 1979) (cited in Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at n.186).
121. Id. (Judgement and Commitment Order).
122. 461 F.Supp. 266 (ED. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1074 (1980), defendant's petition to vacate dismissed, 491 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd,
642 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1981), dismissed again on remand, 546 F.Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 703
F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1983).
123. 602 F.2d at 1130.
124. Id. at 1124.
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). See supra note 58.
126. Id. § 6928(d):
Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste [as de-
fined herein] to a facility which does not have a permit.
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed
under this subchapter either -
(A) without a permit... or
(B) in knowing violation of any... condition. of such permit ... or
(C) in knowing violation... of any applicable ... standards;
(3) knowingly omits material information or makes any false statement in any
[document] ... under this subchapter;
(4) knowingly generates, stores, treats, transports... any hazardous waste.. . and
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hazardous wastes to an unpermitted facility; 2 7 disposing hazardous
wastes without a permit; 2 ' omitting or falsifying information material
on compliance; 129 destroying, altering, or concealing records required
by the Act;130 or transporting hazardous waste without the required
manifest.1
31
In 1980, RCRA was amended to include the offense of "knowing
endangerment."'132 This provision applies only to the most serious cases
of environmental abuse. It provides for felony penalties of up to fifteen
years in prison and/or a fine of $1 million for knowing, life-threatening
actions that violate RCRA prohibitions or requirements.1 33
C. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA),1 34 calls for the clean-up of already existing
hazardous waste disposal sites. The Act provides for a "Superfund" to
finance the clean-ups. This fund is generated mainly through a special tax
levied upon the chemical and petroleum industries. 135 When
"Superfund" monies are used to finance a clean-up effort, the govern-
ment is authorized to seek reimbursement from "responsible parties," as
or fails to file any record .... manifest, report, or other doccument [required by this
statute];
(5) who knowingly transports [hazardous waste] without a mainfest... ; shall,
upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of viola-
tion, or imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both [with the penalties doubled for
second convictions].
Id.
127. Id. § 6928(d)(1).
128. Id. § 6928(d)(2).
129. Id. § 6928(d)(4).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 6928(d)(5)
A leading case on liability under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982) is United States v. Johnson & Tow-
ers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). See infra notes 162-84 and
accompanying test for a detailed discussion of Johnson & Towers.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1982).
133. § 6928(e) states:
Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or exports any hazard-
ous waste... who knows at that time that he thereby places another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury, shall upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not
more than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more than fifteen years, or both. A defend-
ant that is an organization shall ... be subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000.
Id.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982).
135. Id. § 9604.
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defined by the Act.136 CERCLA also requires current owners of property
to disclose any past or present releases of hazardous materials.
The criminal provisions of CERCLA provide for a misdemeanor
penalty of up to one year in jail and a $25,000 fine for knowing destruc-
tion or falsification of certain records.
137
D. Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act (CAA)13 regulates both stationary and moving
sources of air pollution. The EPA establishes air quality standards. State
Implementation Plans translate the standards into emission
limitations.
139
The Act calls for misdemeanor penalties of up to one year in prison
and/or a $25,000 per day of violation fine for knowingly violating air
pollution control requirements"4U or making false documents.141
E. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)142 regulates substances used to repel or destroy insect, plant, or
136. Responsible parties include:
1. Current operators of a facility;
2. Owners or operators of disposal facilities at the time the hazardous substances were disposed of;
3. Persons who arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances by others;
4. Persons who accept or accepted hazardous substances for transport to dispersal or treatment
facilities selected by them.
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982) (quoted in Warshauer & Stansel, Analyzing the Relationship between the
Civil, Governmental, and Criminal Obligations and Liabilities for Hazardous Waste, TORT & INS. L.
J. 37, 49 (1986)).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(2) (1982).
138. Id. §§ 7401-7642.
139. Id. § 7413(c).
140. Id. § 7413(c) states:
(c)(1) Any person who knowingly
(A) violates any requirement of an applicable implementation plan... [as re-
quired by this Act]... shall be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of
violation, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both [with the sanc-
tions doubled for second offenders]
(2) Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, representation, or certifi-
cation in any application, report, plan, or other document [required under this Act] shall
... be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or by both.
Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1982). See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275
(1978).
142. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136y (1982).
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animal life defined as pests. 43
The Act mandates misdemeanor penalties of up to one year in jail
and a $25,000 per day of violation fine for knowingly violating any provi-
sion of the Act;114 using a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its
labelling;145 or distributing an unregistered pesticide.
1 46
F. Toxic Substances Control Act
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)147 is designed to regu-
late chemical substances that are deemed to present an unreasonable risk
of injury to human health or to the environment. The EPA determines
which substances are to be considered unreasonably dangerous, but
the burden of generating the relevant data is placed upon the
manufacturers. 
1 4
The Act provides for misdemeanor penalties of up to one year in jail
and a $25,000 per day of violation fine for knowing or willful violations of
its provisions.
149
"Knowledge" is the mental state required almost exclusively in
these statutes. In a more conventional corporate crime scenario,150 to es-
tablish knowledge, a showing must be made that the defendant was
aware or believed that the unlawful result was almost certain to follow
his act or omission.151 The following section will demonstrate how courts
have so reduced the knowledge requirement, in the application of public
welfare statutes, that the true operational standard is one of strict
liability.
143. Id. § 135.
144. Id. § 135(1)0o).
145. Id. §§ 136j(a)(2)(G), 136(1)(b).
146. Id. §§ 136j(a)(1)(A), 1361(1)(b). See United States v. Corbin Farm Service, 444 F. Supp.
510 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978).
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
148. Id. § 2603(a).
149. Id. § 2615(b).
150. A crime to which the "responsible corporate officer" theory does not apply is what is
meant by conventional corporate crime. See infra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
151. See Riesel, supra note 74, at 10072 ("[K]nowledge requires a lesser standard of proof than
willfulness since the individual with knowledge need not intend or desire the result to occur, so long
as he is substantially certain that it will occur.").
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VI. THE JUDICIALLY CREATED STANDARD FOR FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES CONTAINING MENS REA
REQUIREMENTS: STRICT LIABILITY IN
SUBSTANCE BUT NOT FORM
Courts have taken the rationale developed in the Dotterweich "2 and
Park 15 3 cases-holding corporate officers criminally liable for violations
of strict liability provisions of public welfare statutes' 54-- and extended it
to federal environmental statutes containing scienter requirements. This
hybrid has come to be known as the "responsible corporate officer
theory."'
55
As in Dotterweich and Park, the "responsible corporate officer the-
ory" holds that a corporate official can be criminally convicted for the
violation of a public welfare statute if it can be demonstrated that her
position provided her the opportunity to "seek out, discover and stop" '56
the illegal act, and yet she failed to do so. Actual knowledge of the act is
not required. Under this theory, the Dotterweich and Park principles are
extended to cover public welfare statutes containing mens rea require-
ments. How can a person with absolutely no knowledge of the commis-
sion of an illegal act be held liable when the statute under which she is
charged specifically requires a showing of intent?'57 Courts have con-
cluded that the policy concerns of protecting the public outweigh the
compromise of individual defendants' rights.' Implicit in the reasoning
is the pragmatic realization that, if mens rea requirements were faithfully
152. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
153. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
154. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
155. See McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1153 n.124.
156. Id. at 1153.
157. The principal objection to the "responsible corporate officer" theory is that it provides an
unwarranted relaxation of the scienter requirements of the federal environmental statutes. See
Tundermann, supra note 70, at 2-19.
158. See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
In formulating the "responsible corporate officer" theory, the courts have also sought to satisfy
the clear congressional will that corporate officers be punished for environmental violations. The
clearest expression of this intent is found in the statutes themselves. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c)(3) (1982), and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1982), specifically cover "re-
sponsible corporate officers." The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1361(a)(5), (b)(4) (1982), specifically names officers, agents, and employees. The Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7411-14, 7419-20 (1982), The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(f), 1321 (1982), CER-
CLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(2), 9607-08 (1982), and RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924, 6925(a) (1982), subject
"owners and operators" to certain provisions. The Senate Environment and Public Works Commit-
tee stated that liability should not be limited to the individuals who actually commit the physical act
of polluting, but should include, "those corporate officers under whose responsibility a violation has
taken place." S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1977).
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adhered to, the corporate form would shield all but the most egregious
offenders from the possibility of conviction. 59
The responsible corporate officer theory has the effect of imposing
strict liability upon statutes that ostensibly have mens rea require-
ments. 6' This formulation, along with the judicial sympathy implicit
therein, could be employed by prosecutors to secure widespread convic-
tions of corporate officers for environmental offenses.16
Although the responsible corporate officer theory has not been over-
ruled, the most current case law with respect to criminal actions under
the federal environmental statutes appears to retreat from the strict lia-
bility formulation somewhat. It will be shown, however, that this sup-
posed shift is one of form only. The underlying strict liability remains
intact.
An important case in this area is United States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc. 162 Its rationale has subsequently been embraced by the Eighth1 63
and Eleventh'" Circuits.
Johnson & Towers involved the criminal prosecution of a foreman
and a mid-level manager for a "knowing" violation of RCRA permitting
requirements. 165 Neither defendant was in a position to secure the permit
159. Further, there seems to be an underlying skepticism about the true ignorance of corporate
officers in these types of cases. The desire is to create a positive incentive for officers to actively work
to insure compliance. Strict adherence to traditional scienter requirements would create an incentive
for officers to deliberately insulate themselves from inculpatory information.
160. See McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1154 (for the view that the responsible corpo-
rate officer theory imposes a tort-like "knew or should have known" standard).
161. This strict liability formulation should also substantially decrease the cost of prosecuting
criminal environmental actions because less time and effort would need to be spent establishing
mental culpability. See Federal Enforcement, supra note 1, at 609 (for an illustration of the massive
resources required to be expended to secure a misdemeanor conviction when mental state must be
shown).
162. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
163. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 745 (8th
Cir. 1986) (Johnson & Towers rationale used to impose strict liability under RCRA on past trans-
porters of hazardous waste for present conditions resulting from past activities).
164. See United States v. Hayes International Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (jurors
may draw inferences from all of the circumstances to establish knowledge); see also United States v,
Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986) (Johnson & Towers rationale applied to criminal sanctions of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
165. Specifically, the defendants were charged with the unauthorized draining of methylene
chloride and trichloroethylene from vehicle cleaning operations into a trench which eventually
drained into the Delaware River. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 664 (3d Cir. 1986). There was no
evidence as to defendants' actual knowledge of either the permit requirement or of the illegality of
the discharges. Id. at 670. The charge under review by the Third Circuit was brought under RCRA
and possessed a scienter requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982); see supra note 126 (for the relevant
statutory language).
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for the company on his own authority.
The Court first reiterated the principle expressed in Dotterweich
that:
[T]hough the result may appear harsh, it is well established that crimi-
nal penalties attached to regulatory statutes intended to protect public
health, in contrast to statutes based on common-law crimes, are to be con-
strued to effectuate the regulatory purpose.
1 66
The Court then had to contend with the fact that Dotterweich in-
volved a strict liability statute16 7 and that the case it was considering
dealt with a statute containing a scienter requirement) 6 The opinion
suggested that, because of the public welfare nature of RCRA, there
might be a "reasonable basis for reading the statute without any mens rea
requirement." 1 69 The Court quickly retreated from this statement, rea-
soning that, because of the explicit knowledge requirement and the syn-
tax of the statute,170 the government would have to prove that the
defendants knew that Johnson & Towers, Inc. was required to have a
permit, and also knew that Johnson & Towers, Inc. did not have the
permit.
17 1
At this point, it appears as if the Court was attempting to cut back
on the harsh results and theoretical inconsistencies of the responsible cor-
porate officer theory, and was formulating a standard at least peripher-
ally grounded in intent. 12 This notion is contradicted a few paragraphs
later when the Court announces that "knowledge, including that of
the permit requirement, may be inferred by the jury as to those indi-
viduals who hold the requisite responsible positions" 173 within the
corporation.17 4
By allowing juries to infer knowledge on the basis of position within
the corporate hierarchy, the defendant's actual knowledge becomes irrel-
evant.1 75 Therefore, the Court-imposed standard is very close to strict
166. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666 (3d Cir. 1984).
167. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 126.
169. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. If this view had been accepted, this would have been a
pure application of the responsible corporate officer theory. See supra notes 156-58 and accompany-
ing text (for discussion of responsible corporate officer theory).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 670.
172. See supra note 160.
173. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
174. The determination of what knowledge can be inferred from a particular corporate position
is left to the common sense of trial judges and juries as it was in Dotterweich. Id. See supra note 108.
175. It could be argued that it should be an affirmative defense that, in fact, the defendant did
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liability.176 The strict liability formulation relieves prosecutors of the
burdensome requirement of showing that a corporate officer had actual
knowledge of an environmental violation, previously the major stumbling
block in this type of case. Prosecutors have thus been afforded an ideal
opportunity to secure, on a regular basis, convictions of corporate officers
for environmental crimes-an opportunity which should be exploited to
the fullest.
This relaxation in the standard of proof for individual criminal con-
victions can be utilized to pursue concurrent civil and criminal ac-
tions.17 7 In a concurrent action, if an individual corporate officer knows
that there is a substantial certainty of his conviction on the criminal
charge, she probably will be willing to accept a plea bargain in which she
agrees to cooperate with the government in the civil action against the
corporation in return for leniency in sentencing. Thereby, the ancillary
criminal prosecution complements the civil action.178
It has been argued that the rationale of Johnson & Towers is inap-
propriate because it blurs the distinction between strict liability statutes
and scienter-based laws. 179 This contention is weak, however, for there is
not know of the violation (even though, by virtue of his position, he should have). To allow this
defense would be counterproductive because it would create an incentive for corporate officers to
insulate themselves from knowledge of their companies' activities.
176. The classic definition of strict liability is "liability without fault." BLACK'S LAW DICTION.
ARY 1216 (5th ed. 1979).
177. Concurrent criminal and civil actions have been pursued in the past. See United States v.
Salter, 432 F.2d 697 (lst Cir. 1970); See, eg., Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
178. See McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1159. The threat of criminal prosecution may
also motivate individual corporate officers to come forward prior to any official investigation or
suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. The more liberal civil discovery rules also present the possibility of the
acquisition of evidence that might be utilized in a concurrent criminal action in appropriate circum-
stances. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970). As of yet, what constitutes "appropriate
circumstances" has not been defined. See McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1163 n.172. It is a
difficult determination to make because it requires the courts to, once again, balance criminal defend-
ants' constitutional rights against the public health and welfare. See supra note 158 and accompany-
ing text (for another instance of judicial balancing).
179. The argument runs as follows:
The difference between Park and Johnson & Towers is the type of statute involved: the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not require knowledge or intent, but imposes strict
responsibility on those with the power to prevent or correct unlawful acts. In contrast,
the federal environmental statutes consistently require personal knowledge, intent, or
negligence as the basis for criminal liability. The Third Circuit's dictum in Johnson &
Towers that knowledge can be inferred from position applies the reasoning in Park to a
wholly different statutory scheme. It blurs the distinction between strict liability statutes
and scienter-based laws, and should not be followed.
Tunderman, supra note 70, at 2-21.
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no ambiguity in the substance of the Court's holding. The standard is
almost indistinguishable from classic strict liability. The confusion lies in
how the Court could adopt a strict liability standard in the disposition of
a scienter-based statute.
The Court has essentially paid lip-service to the mens rea require-
ments of the statute. This may represent a superficial attempt to alter the
form to reflect a more constitutionally acceptable standard while retain-
ing the substance of strict liability.
The constitutionality of strict criminal liability has been vigorously
challenged by many commentators. 180 The Court had to balance these
concerns against the hazards posed by continued pollution. It has already
been established that the cumulative effects of pollution are more danger-
ous and their repercussions more long-lasting and profound than any
crime yet faced by a judicial system. 181
The unprecedented nature of the crime requires an unprecedented
response. If ever there existed a situation which mandated the compro-
mise of defendants' individual rights to achieve a greater good, this is it.
In comparision, the personal rights at stake here are not overwhelmingly
compelling. The maximum sentences under the federal environmental
statutes are one year and rarely, if ever, is the maximum assessed. 182 Bal-
anced against this are the continued viability of the earth's ecosystems
and the health and well-being of its inhabitants.183 Pollution must be
180. The principal constitutional challenges to strict criminal liability are: (1) that it violates the
Eighth Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishment and (2) that it denies substantive criminal
law due process in that it is inconsistent with a presumption of innocence. See, eg., Saltzman, supra
note 80.
181. James Moorman, former Assistant Attorney General of the Land and Natural Resources
Division of the Department of Justice, has warned that "[t]he discharge of [pollutants] into the
environment may cause as much harm as any act known to man." Federal Enforcement, supra note
1, at 597 (quoting J. MOORMAN, supra note 77, at 27).
182. In practice most of those convicted receive suspended sentences or probation. In United
States v. Blue Lagoon Marina, Inc., No. 75-80824 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 1975) (cited in Putting
Polluters in Jail, supra note 9, at 103 n.89), the individual defendant was found to have deliberately
discharged hundreds of gallons of gasoline onto a frozen lake and was sentenced only to a minimal
fine. In United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F.Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978), the individual
defendant was convicted of knowingly making false statements in required reports on a regular basis,
and received only a suspended jail sentence. In United States v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., Crim.
No. 82-37-01-L (D.N.H. Apr. 7, 1983) (cited in McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1154) five
defendant corporate officers were convicted for the deliberate bypassing of the company's on-site
wastewater treatment plant and discharging the raw sewage into the river. Incredibly, throughout
the time of the illegal discharge, the company applied for and received about $25 million from the
EPA to study the effectiveness of its wastewater plant (the data was, of course, useless). The defend-
ants in this case all received probation.
183. In United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1326 (6th Cir. 1974), the
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stopped. The corporate forum in which most environmental crimes occur
prevents the effective use of the traditional criminal law. Strict liability
standards for convictions of corporate officers would provide the desired
deterrent effect.
184
There are many who would argue that, notwithstanding these intui-
tively appealing theoretical justifications, the widespread imposition of
strict criminal liability upon corporate officers for violations of environ-
mental statutes should not be pursued because it represents too radical a
departure from the traditional Anglo-American jurisprudential concep-
tion of culpability. On the contrary, far from being radical, the applica-
tion of this type of vicarious criminal liability is perfectly consistent with
the well settled rationale of Dotterweich "5 and Park.
186
If anything, the reasoning of these cases is rendered more compel-
ling by the gravity of the societal interests represented by the environ-
mental statutes. Further, the imposition of strict criminal liability against
corporate officers might be viewed as a parallel to the increased willing-
ness of courts to impose strict liability in the civil setting.187
Courts have become very comfortable with the imposition of strict
personal liability on corporate officers in civil actions under the federal
environmental statutes. 188 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 189 for ex-
ample, the controlling shareholder and officer of the defendant real estate
development company was held personally liable for the cleanup costs of
property upon which he allowed 90,000 gallons of toxic chemicals to be
stored. The defendant did not personally participate in the prohibited
storage, but was deemed responsible because of his indifference. In
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 9' the
president of the defendant corporation was held strictly liable for the
pollution of the local river by petroleum-based chemicals was so severe that the river repeatedly
caught fire. In United States v. Ralston Purina Co., 12 Envt'l L. Rep. (Env. L. Inst.) 2057 OV.D. Ky.
1982) (cited in McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 62, at 1141 n.30), the defendant corporation dis-
charged hexane gas illegally into the sewers of Louisville, Kentucky. The gas eventually triggered a
massive explosion that caused millions of dollars worth of damage and would have taken many lives,
had it not occurred at 5:00 a.m.
184. See supra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
185. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
186. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
187. See generally J. DI MENTo, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS, DILEM-
MAS OP COMPLIANCE (1986) (for a comprehensive discussion of civil environmental enforcement).
188. "[Ilt is now well settled that strict [civil] liability is imposed on any party... responsible
for a hazardous waste site." Warshauer & Stansel, supra note 136, at 52.
189. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
190. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986).
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cleanup costs associated with an illegal disposal of hazardous wastes, de-
spite the fact that he was unaware of the disposal plan, and had in-
structed his employees in a general manner as to the potential dangers
and liabilities of improper disposal. The court predicated the president's
liability upon his capacity to control the disposal that was vested in his
office. This formulation provides the theoretical link between the crimi-
nal and civil conceptions of strict vicarious liability in the environmental
context. The reasoning here is identical to that of Johnson & Towers.191
Although courts routinely impose strict personal liability upon cor-
porate officers in civil environmental cases,192 they remain unwilling to
pierce the corporate veil. 193 Officers' liability is founded upon position
and responsibility within the firm. 194 Thus, in civil cases, as in criminal,
courts have managed to preserve the form of traditional legal doctrine
while obtaining substantively opposite results.
195
The Third Circuit's decision in Johnson & Towers has been good law
for several years. It provides prosecutors with the tools they need to se-
cure convictions on a regular basis. What is needed now is a greater effort
on the part of the government to bring criminal actions under the envi-
ronmental statutes.
VII. CONCLUSION
The extent of the damage to the environment and to the health of
living creatures caused by pollution is staggering. The deleterious effects
will be felt for generations to come. It is ironic that, while we as a society
191. 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). See supra notes 162-84
and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
193. In Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985), the Court specifically declined to hold that
the corporation was the defendant's alter-ego. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. In United
States v. Mahler, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20068 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 1984), the Court held
the president of a disposal company personally liable for cleanup costs based upon his corporate title
without any alter-ego allegations being made. See Note, Piercing the Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego
Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 853 (1982).
194. Most of the federal environmental statutes include "individuals" among the "persons" cov-
ered by them. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1982) (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1982) (CWA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(21) (1982) (CERCLA); 7 U.S.C. § 136(5) (1982) (FIFRA). But the "individual" referred to
is most clearly the person who actually carried out the physical act of pollution. Most of the major
statutes also specifically hold the "owner and operator" liable. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20), 9607, 9608
(1982) (CERCLA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924, 6925(a) (1982) (RCRA); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(f), 1321 (1982)
(CWA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-14, 7419-20 (1982) (CAA). Owner and operator liability has been predi-
cated on capacity to control. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
195. In the criminal context, the legal doctrine that was ostensibly upheld was the mens rea
requirement, and in the civil it is the traditional reluctance to pierce the corporate veil.
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place so much emphasis on attempting to save the world from nuclear
holocaust, we may be striving to save a dying planet. We have only re-
cently begun to realize that the long-term effects of pollution are poten-
tially as threatening to the continued viability of life as we know it as is
nuclear annihilation. The unchecked erosion of the earth's ecosystems as
a result of pollution could render it unfit to support life. The gravity of
the threat warrants a swift and innovative response.
Efforts to control pollution, mainly through civil actions, have met
with little success. The civil remedy of monetary damages is treated by
the offending corporation as a cost of doing business and is ultimately
passed on to the consumer. In a sense, then, the public is being forced to
pay to become a victim of pollution.
The most effective way to circumvent this problem is to expose cor-
porate policy-makers to the threat of criminal prosecution for environ-
mental violations. This would create a positive incentive for corporate
officers to actively pursue compliance with the environmental statutes.
The judicially-developed standards of proof required to convict corporate
officers for environmental offenses have been relaxed so greatly that they
are tantamount to strict liability. Greater effort should be made by the
government to utilize the opportunities provided by these standards to
secure more criminal convictions.
ROBERT A. MILNE
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